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WHEN REAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VEST IN
CALIFORNIA: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN A PLAINTIFF
HAS NOT SECURED REQUIRED GOVERNMENTAL
APPROVALS?
I. INTRODUCTION
The conflict between individual rights and the need for regula-
tion and control by government is one of the most pervasive legal
issues in our country's history.' On one side of the conflict are the
individual rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution and
our democratic government. On the other is the government's need to
retain its ability to govern and control society through use of the
police power. The late Justice Lennon of the California Supreme
Court summarized this conflict well:
The police power of a state is an indispensable prerogative of
sovereignty and one that is not to be lightly limited. Indeed,
even though at times its operation may seem harsh, the impera-
tive necessity for its existence precludes any limitation upon its
exercise save that it be not unreasonably and arbitrarily invoked
and applied. It is not, however, illimitable and the marking and
measuring of the extent of its exercise and application is deter-
mined by a consideration of the question of whether or not any
invocation of that power . . . is reasonably necessary to pro-
mote the public health, safety, morals or general welfare of the
people. . .. '
A good example of this ongoing dispute arises when a property
owner's expectations for development or use of existing improve-
ments conflict with the government's concerns of ensuring the pub-
0 1988 by Steven L. McNeal
1. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (rights of ownership in real property
versus governmental interest in preserving open space and the quality of life in the commu-
nity); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (rights of ownership in
real property versus government's interest in preserving historical landmarks); Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (state legislation interfering with existing contracts
and property rights requires compensation for resulting diminution in value); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (right to contract versus state's interest in protecting the population
through use of labor laws).
2. Miller v. Board of Pub. Works of the City of Los Angeles, 195 Cal. 477, 484, 234 P.
381, 383 (1925).
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lic's health, safety and welfare through the use of zoning and other
land use controls. This issue frequently arises when a land develop-
ment project is planned or constructed, and a new regulation inter-
feres with or prevents completion of the project. New regulations
affecting existing uses of land present the same dilemma.
In these situations, courts must determine whether a vested
right to develop property or to continue a nonconforming use' of
property can be established. Vested rights are defined as "[flights
which have so completely and definitely accrued to . . .a person
that they are not subject to be defeated or canceled [sic] by the act of
any other private person, and which it is right and equitable that the
government should recognize and protect as being lawful in them-
selves. . . ." If a plaintiff constructs improvements in good faith
reliance on governmental authorization, a vested right to complete
the improvements may exist. Once a vested right is created, the gov-
ernment may not prevent completion of planned improvements
through changes in zoning laws.' Likewise, if a plaintiff secures a
vested right to continue a nonconforming use of existing improve-
ments, the government may not prohibit the present use of the
property.6
There must be overt governmental action to establish a vested
right. The rule in both California and other jurisdictions has long
been that if a building permit issues, the requirement of overt gov-
ernmental action is fulfilled. If, in reliance on the issued building
permit, a plaintiff performs substantial work and incurs substantial
liabilities, a vested right accrues to his benefit.7 This rule parallels
the common law prerequisites for establishing a vested right.8
3. BLACK'S LAW DIcriONARY 948 (5th ed. 1979). A "nonconforming use" is defined
as:
A structure the size, dimension or location of which was lawful prior to the
adoption, revision or amendment of a zoning ordinance, but which fails to con-
form to the requirements of the zoning district in which it is located by reasons
of such adoption, revision or amendment. A use which does not comply with
present zoning provisions but which existed lawfully and was created in good
faith prior to the enactment of the zoning provision.
Id.
4. Id. at 1402.
5. Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785,
791, 553 P.2d 546, 550, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 390, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977).
6. Halaco Eng'g Co. v. South Central Coast Regional Comm'n, 42 Cal. 3d 52, 720 P.2d
15, 227 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1986).
7. Avco Community Dev., 17 Cal. 3d at 791, 553 P.2d at 550, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 390
(citing Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904)); Trans-Oceanic Oil Corp. v.
City of Santa Barbara, 85 Cal. App. 2d 776, 194 P.2d 148 (1948); Shamrock Dev. Co. v. City
of Concord, 656 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1981); City of Hollywood v. Hollywood Beach Hotel Co.,
283 So. 2d 867, 869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), affd in part, rev'd in part, 329 So. 2d 10
[Vol. 28
PROPERTY RIGHTS
California courts have articulated that issuance of a building
permit satisfies the governmental act requirement. 9 However, in a
renowned vested rights decision, the California Supreme Court failed
to address the issue of whether a building permit is actually
mandatory. In Avco Community Developers Inc. v. South Central
Coast Regional Commission,'0 the court suggested that a permit
which affords essentially the same specificity and definition to a pro-
ject as a building permit may be the basis of a vested rights claim. 1'
Faced with the actual facts of Avco, however, the court denied the
plaintiff a vested right to construct improvements because the ap-
provals inadequately defined the scope of the project. 2
Recently, the California Supreme Court implicitly extended the
rationale of Avco by upholding a trial court decision granting a
vested right to continue nonconforming uses of property. In Halaco
Engineering Co. v. South Central Coast Regional Commission,'"
the court recognized a vested right to continue nonconforming uses of
existing improvements even though permits received by the plaintiff
did not specifically authorize the judicially protected operations. Al-
though the governmental approvals did not specifically define these
nonconforming uses, the court exempted some of the plant's opera-
tions from further governmental regulation. 4 Unfortunately, the
opinion fails to describe what governmental actions, other than issu-
ance of a building permit, enable plaintiffs to assert vested rights
claims.
This comment examines when courts recognize the existence of
(1976); Reichenbach v. Windward at Southhampton, 80 Misc. 2d 1031, 364 N.Y.S.2d 283,
291-93 (Sup. Ct. 1976), affd, 372 N.Y.S.2d 985 (A.D. 1975). See also Delaney & Kominers,
He Who Rests Less Vests Best: Acquisition of Vested Rights in Land Development, 23 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 220 (1979).
8. Avco Community Dev., 17 Cal. 3d at 791-93, 553 P.2d at 550-51, 132 Cal. Rptr. at
390-91.
9. See, e.g., id. at 785, 553 P.2d at 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 386; Spindler Realty Corp. v.
Monning, 243 Cal. App. 2d 255, 53 Cal. Rptr. 7, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 975 (1966); Anderson
v. City Council of the City of Pleasant Hill, 229 Cal. App. 2d 79, 40 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1964);
Wheat v. Barrett, 210 Cal. 193, 290 P. 1033 (1930); Brougher v. Board of Pub. Works of the
City and County of San Francisco, 205 Cal. 426, 271 P. 487 (1928); Pelham View Apart-
ments Inc. v. Switzer, 130 Misc. 545, 224 N.Y.S. 56 (1927); Brett v. Building Comm'r of
Brookline, 250 Mass. 73, 145 N.E. 269 (1924).
10. 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976).
11. Id. at 793-94, 553 P.2d at 551, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
12. Id. The court never reached this issue because none of the permits secured by Avco
Community Developers related to identifiable buildings.
13. 42 Cal. 3d 52, 720 P.2d 15, 227 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1986).
14. Halaco, 42 Cal. 3d at 60, 720 P.2d at 19, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
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governmental action if required approvals have not been secured by
a plaintiff. Section II examines the law of vested rights by outlining
the development of both the common law and the current laws gov-
erning vested rights. Historical and contemporary California case
law is discussed in this section. Modern rules governing vested rights
are then delineated, and the factors which courts currently examine
in determining whether a vested right exists are discussed. Section
III analyzes the current status of the law of vested rights in the area
of real property, emphasizing that the government action require-
ment is inadequately defined. Section IV proposes that vested rights
cases be adjudicated by examining whether a plaintiff entertained an
objectively reasonable, good-faith belief that development or use of
real property could continue, rather than by examining only the ex-
tent of the government's actions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Development of Common Law Rules
Recognition of a vested right to use or construct improvements
under the common law requires that a property owner perform sub-
stantial work and incur substantial liabilities in good faith reliance
on a valid building permit." When modern rules governing vested
rights are discussed, it will be demonstrated that this rule evolved
from two common law doctrines: equitable estoppel and constitu-
tional protection of property. 6
One of the first vested rights cases established the requirement
that a plaintiff rely in good faith upon governmental authorization
when asserting a vested rights claim under the common law. In
Dainese v. Cooke," the plaintiff obtained a permit to construct im-
provements and proceeded with substantial construction. 8 The city's
building inspector then concluded that the buildings did not conform
with municipal regulations. The municipality argued that the mater-
ials used in construction were inferior, that the construction was thus
in violation of building regulations, and that the buildings were a
danger to the community.19 The United States Supreme Court deter-
mined that the city's assertions were not supported by a preponder-
15. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 43-61 and accompanying text.
17. 91 U.S. 580 (1875).
18. At the time of the revocation of the permit, the foundations for the buildings and the
walls had been constructed.
19. Dainese v. Cooke, 91 U.S. 580, 580-83 (1875).
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ance of the evidence, and estopped the city from interfering with
completion of the project.2"
Likewise, in one of the earliest cases finding a vested "private
property right,"2 the court relied heavily on the fact that develop-
ment began in reliance on a building permit. In City of Buffalo v.
Chadeayne,2 2 the plaintiff entered into contracts for materials and
proceeded with construction, relying upon a municipal resolution
permitting him to construct seven homes. The plaintiff was then
given oral notice of a city council decision to revoke the resolution
granting him the right to initiate construction. When several of the
homes were near completion, a written copy of the resolution was
served on the plaintiff. On appeal the court recognized that a "pri-
vate property right [to develop in accord with the resolution] had
• . . vested . . . prior to the recission of the resolution" because the
plaintiff incurred considerable liabilities in reliance on permission
originally given by the city.23
In a similar common law case, the court focused on the require-
ment that substantial work be completed, and that substantial liabili-
ties be incurred before a plaintiff can successfully assert a vested
rights claim. In Brett v. Building Commissioner of Brookline,24 the
court addressed the issue of whether a building permit conferred a
vested right to develop property if the proposed improvements con-
flicted with a later enacted zoning ordinance.2 ' The permit's later
cancellation by the government was upheld even though the excava-
tion and the initial engineering for the building were completed. By
the time the permit was rescinded, progress towards completion was
minimal.2 ' Therefore, the court reasoned that a vested right was not
present because the construction did not amount to an "existing
structure" within the meaning of a Massachusetts statute.2 7 These
20. Id. at 584.
21. City of Buffalo v. Chadeayne, 134 N.Y. 163, 165, 31 N.E. 443, 444 (1892).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 165, 31 N.E. at 444.
24. 250 Mass. 73, 145 N.E. 269 (1924).
25. Cunningham, Vested Rights, Estoppel, and the Land Development Process, 29
HASTINGS L.J. 625, 680 (1978). The authors cite the New York case of Switzer as another
case which California courts relied on extensively in formulating case law. 130 Misc. 545, 224
N.Y.S. 56 (1927). In Switzer a revocation of a permit was also held to be invalid under the
general common law rule of vested rights. Id.
26. Brett, 250 Mass. at 80, 145 N.E. at 270-72.
27. Id. at 81, 145 N.E. at 271-72. Before deciding the work on the new structure was
insufficient to establish a vested right to develop, the court upheld the government's right to
exercise its police power in a reasonable manner. The court determined that the reasonable
exercise of the police power for public health or safety reasons extended to the ownership of
19881
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cases delineate the factors courts consider when a vested rights claim
is litigated, and exemplify the gradual development of the common
law rule requiring substantial expenditures in good faith reliance on
governmental actions.
B. Development of Vested Rights Rules in California
1. Early California Cases
Several California vested rights cases partially relied on these
Massachusetts and New York rulings."8 The following cases are rep-
resentative of the evolution of vested rights rules in California.
One of the earliest California cases addressing a vested rights
issue emphasized the requirement that there be governmental action
before a plaintiff may assert a cause of action. Brougher v. Board of
Public Works of the City and County of San Francisco"9 involved a
plaintiff's request for a writ of mandamus requiring the defendant to
issue a building permit pursuant to a proper application. ° After the
plaintiff filed for a building permit, a height limitation was imposed
in the area where the plaintiff's development was planned, making
the plaintiff's construction scheme nonconforming under the terms of
the new ordinance.81 Because the permit and plans were not ap-
proved by the proper governmental agencies, the court refused to rec-
ognize governmental action or a vested right to build. 2
California courts also considered the extent to which a plaintiff
was required to proceed with development before acquiring a vested
right to finalize a project. In Wheat v. Barrett,88 the plaintiff chal-
land and upheld the state's right to regulate uses of land through use of the police power in the
form of zoning regulations. Id. at 77, 145 N.E. at 270-71. See also Commonwealth v. Badger,
243 Mass. 137, 137 N.E. 261 (1922).
28. See Cunningham, supra note 25, at 680.
29. 205 Cal. 426, 271 P. 487 (1928).
30. Brougher, 205 Cal. at 428-29, 271 P. at 488.
31. Id. at 430, 271 P. at 489. A similar factual situation was presented in Miller. 195
Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925). In this case, a valid building permit issued from the Board of
Public Works. After the plaintiff learned of a planned ordinance which would effect his right
to construct the proposed building, the Board of Public Works revoked the original permit and
denied the plaintiff's subsequent application based on the fact that the new ordinance was then
in effect. However, the court never reached a vested rights issue because the plaintiff failed to
argue that the Board lacked the power to revoke a previously issued permit, or that the Board
could not retroactively nullify a previously issued permit. Id. at 481-82, 234 P. at 382.
32. Brougher, 205 Cal. at 432-33, 271 P. at 491. See also Commonwealth v. Atlas, 244
Mass. 78, 138 N.E. 243 (1923); General Baking Co. v. Board of Commr's of Boston, 242
Mass. 194, 197, 136 N.E. 245 (1922) (once a permit is acted upon by a property owner it
cannot be revoked in the absence of a special power or a change in legislation).
33. 210 Cal. 193, 290 P. 1033 (1930).
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lenged the validity of a zoning ordinance, and received a writ at trial
estopping city officials from further interference with his develop-
ment. After entering into contracts for construction and excavating
the land, an appellate court stayed the writ, and a new ordinance
was passed disallowing completion of the project. 4 Since the amount
of work performed was deemed inconsequential in proportion to the
total cost of the project, the court reasoned that substantial liabilities
were not incurred and refused to confer a vested right to complete
development. 5
The California Supreme Court also examined the issue of
whether present land uses should be preserved if new zoning ordi-
nances result in transformation of improvements into nonconforming
uses. 6 In Jones v. City of Los Angeles,3 7 the city passed an ordi-
nance prohibiting the operation of sanitariums in certain residential
zones, and attempted to enjoin the operation of several sanitariums
on the grounds that they represented an illegal nonconforming use.
The court recognized zoning ordinances as a justifiable exercise of
the police power, 8 upholding the ordinance as valid and enforceable
against future uses. However, the court refused to enforce the ordi-
nance retroactively. Applying equitable estoppel, the court weighed
the public benefit of advancing the general welfare against the pri-
vate interest of preserving an existing, non-nuisance use of the prop-
erty.3 9 Because the ordinance only promoted the general welfare and
did not involve a health or safety hazard, the court circumscribed the
police power. ' In effect, it granted a vested right to continue non-
conforming uses of property. However, the court failed to set any
guidelines to determine when a vested right in a nonconforming use
might be recognized.4 1
These early California cases emphasize that the government
34. Id. at 195, 290 P. at 1035. The ordinance restricted the construction of store build-
ings to very limited districts, and defendant's proposed structure did not fall within one of
these districts.
35. Id. at 197, 290 P. at 1035.
36. Cunningham, supra note 25, at 683.
37. 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930).
38. Id. at 307, 295 P. at 16.
39. Id. at 314-15, 295 P. at 19.
40. Id. at 315, 295 P. at 19. Police power may be exercised absolutely to abate a nui-
sance which threatens public health or safety, but the court recognized that the police power,
in the form of zoning ordinances, is limited to ordinances which are reasonable in object and
not arbitrary in operation. Since the sanitariums posed no health or safety threat, the govern-
ment's zoning powers were limited. For a development and discussion of constitutional issues
concerning limitations on the police power, see Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
41. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930).
1988]
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must act in a manner sufficient to justify detrimental reliance by a
plaintiff. From the above cases, it is clear that without an act or
omission by the government, a plaintiff's vested rights claim will al-
most certainly fail. These cases also exemplify the evolution of Cali-
fornia's vested rights laws from the concept of equitable estoppel.""
The requirement that the courts weigh and balance the private harm
resulting from a new regulation against the public benefit is also
demonstrated.
2. Modern Rules Governing Vested Rights
Modern interpretations of earlier case law have resulted in
courts applying one of two recognized rules when a vested rights
dispute is litigated: equitable estoppel or vested rights."'
Equitable estoppel requires that a plaintiff act in good faith on
some act or omission of the government, substantially changing his
or her position, or incurring large obligations or expenses in reliance
on the government's representations." This standard recognizes that
it is inequitable to disallow proposed uses of property when the
owner detrimentally relies on the government's actions."' The theory
also balances the public interest promoted by the regulation against
the injuries sustained by the property owner.4" Thus, if all the fac-
tors of equitable estoppel are present, courts may determine that
public concerns outweigh the private detriment, and retroactively en-
force a zoning ordinance.
In contrast, the concept of vested rights is derived from both
common law and constitutional law principles.47 The vested rights
concept is based on essentially identical standards as equitable estop-
pel.4 However, under a vested rights theory, courts usually do not
balance the public and private interests involved.49
42. Billings v. California Coastal Comm'n, 103 Cal. App. 3d 729, 163 Cal. Rptr. 288
(1980) (California's vested rights principles are a manifestation of equitable estoppel, not a
common law rule nor a constitutional principle).
43. SIEMON, LARSON & PORTER, VESTED RIGHTS: BALANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
DEVELOPMENT EXPECTATIONS 13 (1982).
44. Heeter, Zoning Estoppel: Application of the Principles of Equitable Estoppel and
Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes, URBAN L. ANN. 63, 66 (1971).
45. SIEMON, LARSON & PORTER, supra note 43, at 13.
46. Id. See also Shamrock, 656 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1981); City of Hollywood, 283 So.
2d 867, affid in part, rev'd in part, 329 So. 2d 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
47. Heeter, supra note 44, at 64-65. See also Department of Transp. v. P.S.C. Re-
sources, Inc., 175 N.J. Super. 447, 419 A.2d 1151 (1980); Billings, 103 Cal. App. 3d 729, 163
Cal. Rptr. 288 (1980) (discussing factors examined in determining whether a vested right
exists).
48. SIEMON, LARSON & PORTER, supra note 43, at 13; Heeter, supra note 44, at 64-
65.
49. SIEMON, LARSON & PORTER, supra note 43, at 13; Heeter, supra note 44, at 64-
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Although there are two distinct doctrines governing vested
rights, courts in both California and other jurisdictions have merged
them."' Often, the same result is achieved when applying these theo-
ries to identical fact patterns.51 The merging of these two theories
resulted in the examination of four factors when determining
whether a vested right is formed."
The first factor is the requirement of governmental action au-
thorizing a course of activity or development.5" This action usually
takes the form of a permit, although a permit is not necessary in all
situations." For example, if a plaintiff acquires a building permit,
the governmental act requirement is deemed fulfilled.5
The second and third elements are good faith and reliance on
governmental action." The element of good faith is satisfied if a
plaintiff commences construction in accord with governmental ap-
provals.5 7 Reliance is evidenced by a plaintiffi incurring substantial
expenditures and completing substantial work in development or
continuing use of property.5
Finally, in some situations, courts weigh and balance the public
interest against private interests to determine whether fundamental
unfairness would result if government actions destroy a significant
vested right."9
While courts attach importance to the governmental action re-
quirement, 60 there is often confusion surrounding it. Therefore, this
comment discusses various interpretations of this factor."
50. SIEMON, LARSON & PORTER, supra note 43, at 13; Heeter, supra note 44, at 64-
65.
51. Heeter, supra note 44, at 65.
52. SIEMON, LARSON & PORTER, supra note 43, at 13.
53. SIEMON, LARSON & PORTER, supra note 43, at 13.
54. See cases collected under 49 A.L.R. 3d, 13 (1973). See also Avco Community Dev.,
17 Cal. 3d at 785, 553 P.2d at 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
55. Avco Community Dev., 17 Cal. 3d at 785, 553 P.2d at 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
56. SIEMON, LARSON & PORTER, supra note 43, at 13; Heeter, supra note 44, at 66-
67.
57. Switzer, 130 Misc. at 545, 224 N.Y.S. at 56.
58. Id.; Halaco, 42 Cal. 3d at 52, 720 P.2d at 15, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
59. Hilton Hotels Corp. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 435 A.2d
1062, 1065 (D.C. 1981); Goto v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 423 A.2d
917, 925 n.15 (D.C. 1980).
60. This requirement is important because it must first be established before a vested
rights argument will even be considered by the courts. SIEMON, LARSON & PORTER, supra
note 43, at 13-14.
61. See generally, SIEMON, LARSON & PORTER, supra note 43, at 13-14, for a complete
discussion and analysis of the other factors courts examine in analyzing whether a vested right
has been established.
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3. The Governmental Action Requirement
The requirement of governmental action is the most unsettled of
the aforementioned four factors because courts have failed to develop
a succinct definition of actions which will satisfy this element. With-
out the aid of such a crucial definition, plaintiffs are unable to deter-
mine whether this factor has been met." Additionally, construction
projects often mandate an array of governmental approvals," and
require constant contact with governmental officials at both a formal
and informal level. These factors complicate the issue of whether the
government has acted in a manner sufficient to justify detrimental
reliance by the plaintiff." Thus, procuring approvals sufficient to
constitute governmental action becomes an issue of the utmost impor-
tance to plaintiffs pursuing vested rights litigation.
This factor requires approval of a particular use of real prop-
erty through some form of official action by a governmental entity.
Courts in most jurisdictions, including California, use issuance of a
building permit as the benchmark to determine whether there is gov-
ernmental action." However, if a building permit or other required
permit has not been issued, the outcome is more problematic. Deci-
sions regarding vested rights are inconsistent if a plaintiff has not
secured required approvals. California's courts have not resolved this
issue."6
62. SIEMON, LARSON & PORTER, supra note 43, at 29.
63. SIEMON, LARSON & PORTER, supra note 43, at 29.
64. SIEMON, LARSON & PORTER, supra note 43, at 29.
65. Avco Community Dev., 17 Cal. 3d at 785, 553 P.2d at 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 386;
Halaco, 42 Cal. 3d 52, 720 P.2d 15, 227 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1986); Spindler, 243 Cal. App. 2d
255, 53 Cal. Rptr. 7, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 975 (1966); Anderson, 229 Cal. App. 2d 79, 40
Cal. Rptr. 41 (1964); Town of Paradise Valley v. Gulf Leisure Corp., 27 Ariz. App. 600, 557
P.2d 532 (1976); Raley v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 68 Cal. App. 3d 965,
137 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1977); Dainese, 91 U.S. 580 (1875). It should be noted that once a vested
right to develop is established, expiration of a building permit because of a decision to delay
completion of a project will not necessarily result in loss of a vested rights claim to build in
accordance with issued permits. Pardee Const. Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 95 Cal.
App. 3d 471, 157 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1979).
66. See, e.g., Halaco, 42 Cal. 3d at 52, 720 P.2d at 15, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 667; Avco
Community Dev., 17 Cal. 3d at 785, 553 P.2d at 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
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4. Contemporary Court Decisions
.a. Avco Community Developers Inc. v. South Coast Re-
gional Commission
The California case which exemplifies the general rule that a
building permit is required to satisfy the governmental action ele-
ment is Avco." In this case, Orange County rezoned 5,234 acres as a
planned community development6" pursuant to an application by
Avco. The county then approved a final subdivision map and issued
Avco a rough grading permit. After Avco graded the land, installed
improvements, expended over two million dollars, and incurred sub-
stantial liabilities,6' the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of
19720 was passed. The Act required permits for any development
within the coastal zone71 unless a vested right was acquired prior to
the effective date of the Act.7 ' Although a portion of Avco's proposed
development fell within the coastal zone, Avco applied for an exemp-
tion from the permit requirement because it had allegedly completed
substantial work in grading the land and installing improvements.
After the South Coast Regional Commission and the state-wide
Coastal Commission denied Avco a waiver, Avco sought a writ of
67. 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1977).
68. The court states that the "Planned Community Development" was to proceed ac-
cording to "Plinned Community District Regulations" which were enacted by the county.
Tract 7479 was devoted largely to multiple residential purposes. Id. at 789, 553 P.2d at 549,
132 Cal. Rptr. at 389. Such a development scheme is equivalent to a "Planned Unit Develop-
ment" which "generally refers to a subdivision which provides for a mixture of land uses -
residential, commercial, service, industrial - all in a single district but, . . . segregated by the
planner." BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 555 (3d ed. 1981).
69. Avco Community Dev., 17 Cal. 3d at 789-91, 553 P.2d at 549, 132 Cal. Rptr. at
389.
70. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 27000-27650 (West 1976), repealed by CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 27650 (West 1986).
71. At the time administrative proceedings commenced, California Public Resources
Code section 30601 defined the coastal zone in terms of what permits were required from the
Regional Commission. The code reads, in pertinent part:
Prior to certification of the local coastal program and, where applicable, in addi-
tion to a permit from local government pursuant to subdivision (b) of section
30600, a coastal development permit shall be obtained from the regional com-
mission . . . for any of the following:
(1) Developments between the sea and the first public road paralleling the
sea or within 300 feet to the inland extent of any beach or of the mean high tide
line of the sea where there is no beach, whichever is the greater distance.(2) Developments not included within paragraph (1) located on tidelands,
submerged lands, public trust lands, within 100 feet of any wetland, estuary,
stream, or within 300 feet of the top of the seaward face of any coastal bluff.
CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30601 (West 1986).
72. The effective date of the act was February 1, 1973.
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mandate to compel the Coastal Commission to grant an exemption.
Avco contended that the commission was estopped from denying an
exemption since Avco relied detrimentally on several county authori-
zations issued prior to the effective date of the Act.73 Both the trial
court and the California Supreme Court denied Avco's vested rights
claim on the basis that no building permit issued, reasoning that the
governmental approvals received were insufficient to vest rights to
proceed with development. 4
However, the California Supreme Court failed to address the
issue of whether another type of permit might satisfy the governmen-
tal action requirement if it provided substantially the same specificity
and definition to a project as a building permit.7 5 Thus, the issue of
what governmental actions are sufficient to fulfill this element was
left unanswered.
b. Guidelines For Satisfying the Governmental Act
Requirement
Several decisions serve as a guide in determining the question
left open by Avco; what governmental actions, less than a building
permit, will satisfy the governmental action requirement. Courts
have determined whether the following factors satisfy this require-
ment: existing zoning, prior zoning, the absence of zoning, antici-
pated zoning, rezoning of property, special use permits, informal
governmental approvals, non-enforcement of zoning violations, sub-
division approvals, receiving permits under mistake of fact or in vio-
lation of law and preliminary permits. These decisions are important
because they represent a continuum, defining what governmental ac-
tions courts may be willing to recognize as sufficient to enable a
plaintiff to assert a vested rights claim to complete planned
improvements.
Courts have determined that existing or prior zoning of prop-
erty is not governmental action sufficient to vest rights. 76 In addition,
73. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27404 (West 1976), repealed by CAL. PUB. RF.s. CODE §
30608 (West 1986). Avco Community Dev., 17 Cal. 3d at 790, 553 P.2d at 549, 132 Cal. Rptr.
at 389.
74. Avco Community Dev., 17 Cal. 3d. at 793, 553 P.2d at 551, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
75. Id. at 794, 553 P.2d at 551, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
76. San Diego Gas & Elec. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins, 447 U.S.
255 (1980); Gillilard v. County of Los Angeles, 126 Cal. App. 3d 610, 179 Cal. Rptr. 73
(1981). While these cases did not deal specifically with vested rights, they comport with the
principle that the remedy for an inverse condemnation claim is not monetary compensation.
This implies no vested right was recognized because if it were, monetary compensation would
be required for a taking of property. See also City of Carmel-By-the-Sea v. Monterey County
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neither the absence of zoning"' nor anticipated zoning of property
will satisfy this element.78 The 'rationale supporting these general
rules is that there is no overt governmental action to approve a spe-
cific development or use of property. 9
However, in some jurisdictions, a vested right to develop land
according to existing zoning was based partially on the fact that the
land's purchase price reflected its expected use as zoned.80 California
courts follow the general rule, and reject reliance on existing zoning
as sufficient to demonstrate governmental action.8 California law re-
quires compliance with zoning or other land use regulations at the
time a building permit is issued, not at the time that the property
was initially zoned for a proposed use.8
California courts have also examined whether rezoning of prop-
erty is adequate to fulfill the governmental action requirement. As a
general rule, site specific rezoning of land does not constitute govern-
Bd. of Supervisors, 71 Cal. App. 3d 84, 139 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1977) (landowners have no vested
right to develop property under an existing zoning law absent a showing of detrimental reli-
ance on prior governmental approval); Sierra v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 79 Cal.
App. 3d 439, 144 Cal. Rptr. 776, cert. denied, 440 U.S. 957 (1979) (damages for inverse
condemnation denied where rezoning resulted in a seventy-five percent reduction in value of
plaintiff's land); Elam v. Albers, 44 Colo. App. 281, 616 P.2d 168 (1980) (no vested right to
nonconforming use of land where no steps had been taken prior to challenging the zoning of
the land to develop land as a mobile home subdivision).
77. Pasco County v. Tampa Dev. Corp., 364 So. 2d 850, 853 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978); Beasley v. Potter, 493 F. Supp. 1059 (Mich. D.C. 1980).
78. Morse v. County of San Luis Obispo, 247 Cal. App. 2d 600, 55 Cal. Rptr. 710
(1967).
79. Avco Community Dev., 17 Cal. 3d at 793, 553 P.2d at 551, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 391(by zoning property, the government makes no representation to property owners that they
will be exempt from the zoning laws in effect at the time they apply for a building permit, or
that they may construct particular structures on the property). See also Pasco, 364 So. 2d at
850.
80. May Dep't Stores Co. v. County of St. Louis, 607 S.W.2d 857, 863 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980). The court focused primarily on the fact that the rezoning was done in an arbitrary
manner rather than on expenditures made by the plaintiff. See also Town of Largo v. Imperial
Homes Corp., 309 So. 2d 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); City of Gainesville v. Bishop, 174So. 2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (purchase of land contingent on obtaining rezoning).
81. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text; see also San Diego County v. Mc-
Clurken, 37 Cal. 2d 683, 234 P.2d 972 (1951) (landowner's purpose in purchasing land must
yield to public interest in enforcement of comprehensive zoning plan).
82. Pardee Const. Co. v. City of Camarillo, 37 Cal. 3d 465, 690 P.2d 701, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 228 (1984). On judicial review of a denial of a building permit, the reviewing court will
generally apply the law existing at the time the permit was denied. Thus, after a permit has
been issued, it may be revoked on the basis of a subsequent change in the zoning laws unless
the permittee has substantial detrimental reliance expenditures, or the amended zoning ordi-
nance is found inapplicable if its enactment was meant to frustrate a particular development.
Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr.
799 (1973). See also cases collected under 50 A.L.R. 3d 596, 602 (1973).
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mental action.8" Reliance on rezoning is also not adequate to comply
with this requirement even if the plaintiff has expended considerable
funds in good faith."' However, special use permits have been sanc-
tioned as governmental acts sufficient to vest rights.8 5 A plaintiff is
also afforded some protection against unreasonable zoning ordi-
nances by the right to challenge the constitutionality of either an ex-
isting zone, or the rezoning of property. The plaintiff's constitutional
claim must allege that there is no constitutional basis for eithe'r the
original zoning or the rezoning,86 or that there is no relationship
between the ordinance and the public's health, safety and welfare.
8 7
Informal governmental approvals of land use are also not
equivalent to governmental action. Because these acts are not official,
a plaintiff may not reasonably rely on them since knowledge of ap-
plicable laws is imputed to the plaintiff.88 Conversely, non-enforce-
ment of a zoning ordinance violation is not interpreted as govern-
mental action because no positive steps were taken b4.. the
government to enforce compliance with existing regulations.8
Subdivision approvals also present the problem of whether the
government acted in a manner sufficient for a plaintiff to assert a
vested rights claim. Subdivision approval regulations govern only lot
sizes and shapes. Courts do not recognize subdivision approvals as
governmental actions sufficient to establish a vested right to complete
a project.90
83. Trever v. City of Sterling Heights, 53 Mich. App. 144, 218 N.W.2d 810 (1974);
Avco Community Dev., 17 Cal. 3d at 793, 553 P.2d at 551, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
84. See generally Avco Community Dev., 17 Cal. 3d at 785, 553 P.2d at 546, 132 Cal.
Rptr. at 386; Halaco, 42 Cal. 3d at 52, 720 P.2d at 15, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 667; Spindler, 243
Cal. App. 2d at 255, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 7; Gillilard, 126 Cal. App. 3d 610, 179 Cal. Rptr. 73
(1981).
85. Trans-Oceanic Oil Corp., 85 Cal. App. 2d 776, 194 P.2d 148 (1948). However, the
court noted that it was influenced by the special circumstances of the case, and because the
special use permit related to extraction of a natural resource. See also Cohn v. County Bd. of
Supervisors of Los Angeles County., 135 Cal. App. 2d 180, 286 P.2d 836 (1955) (special use
permits under a zoning ordinance run with the land).
86. Oceanic California, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 497 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
87. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1 (1974); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Existing zoning or
zoning change must be based on a tangible reason or bear a relationship to the public welfare
or public safety.
88. SIEMON, LARSON & PORTER, supra note 43, at 17-19.
89. Donovan v. City of Santa Monica, 88 Cal. App. 2d 386, 199 P.2d 51 (1948); Lock-
ard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 202 P.2d 38, cert. denied, 337 U.S. 939 (1949);
Markey v. Danville Warehouse and Lumber Inc., 119 Cal. App. 2d 1, 259 P.2d 19 (1953).
90. SIEMON, LARSON & PORTER, supra note 43, at 24-26.
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In addition, receiving a permit or approval issued under mistake
of fact or in violation of law is not government action because an
individual possessing such a permit is deemed to know the terms of
the law as well as the authority of the person issuing the permit."1
Recently, however, one court allowed a recipient of such a permit to
finish a proposed project because he expended substantial sums in
good faith reliance on the government's representations.92
Likewise, courts reject preliminary permits as being governmen-
tal actions sufficient to create a vested right to complete planned im-
provements.9" Courts justify this reasoning on several bases. First,
the purpose of a two-stage approval process requiring issuance of a
preliminary permit and a final building permit is to give greater con-
trol and flexibility in planning development and use of land.94 Addi-
tionally, preliminary permits, such as grading or excavation permits,
are mandated for most projects. Therefore, a property owner does
not suffer substantial injury or detriment if the ultimate proposal
differs from development allowed by the final grading permit.9" The
general rule governing preliminary permits in California is that any
work performed on a project pursuant to the permit will vest rights
to complete only that stage of the work.9
c. Halaco Engineering Co. v. South Central Coast Re-
gional Commission
In California, it is possible for a preliminary permit offering the
same specificity and definition to a project as a building permit to
91. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Village, Inc. v. Costle, 502 F. Supp. 213 (D. Maryland
1980); Sierra Club v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 58 Cal. App. 3d 149,
129 Cal. Rptr. 743 (1976) (void permit not sufficient to vest rights).
92. Abbeville Arms v. City of Abbeville, 273 S.C. 491, 257 S.E.2d 716 (1979).
93. Avco Community Dev., 17 Cal. 3d at 785, 553 P.2d at 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 386;
McCarthy v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 129 Cal. App. 3d 222, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 866 (1982).
94. SIEMON, LARSON & PORTER, supra note 43, at 19.
95. SIEMON, LARSON & PORTER, supra note 43, at 19.
96. McCarthy, 129 Cal. App. 3d 222, 180 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1982). The court found no
vested right to complete construction, even though the foundation for the building was com-
pleted in accordance with a properly issued foundation permit. The court determined that
there was no detrimental reliance by the landowner because the government expressly advised
the plaintiff not to rely on the foundation permit as a right to complete the project, and that
the project would be subjected to further governmental scrutiny. See also Avco Community
Dev., 17 Cal. 3d at 792, 553 P.2d 550-51, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (citing Spindler, 243 Cal.
App. 2d 255, 53 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1966) (grading permits)). Court House Plaza Co. v. City of
Palo Alto, 117 Cal. App. 3d 871, 173 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1981) (first stage of a two-stage building
project).
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form the basis of a vested rights claim.97 This apparent exception to
the rule that preliminary permits will vest rights only in defined
stages of a project was implicitly confirmed by the California Su-
preme Court in Halaco Engineering Co. v. South Central Coast
Regional Commission."' In this case, the court examined whether a
vested right existed despite the fact that permits secured by Halaco
Engineering Company did not authorize all uses deemed protected
from further governmental regulation by the court.""
The case arose with the passage of the California Coastal Zone
Conservation Act of 1972.100 The Act required application for a per-
mit from the regional coastal commission for any development within
the coastal zone.101 While Halaco's operations fell within the defined
coastal zone, it failed to apply for a permit. Halaco believed that no
permit was needed since it had been operating its facilities prior to
the effective date of the Act.
10 2
The principal factual issues in the case were whether Halaco
had all the permits required by the City of Oxnard for construction
and use of its facilities, and whether Halaco's continuing operation
of the plant conformed to operations conducted when the permit ap-
plication was made. 03 The Act exempted any development for
which a vested right had been acquired. " Thus, Halaco would be
exempt from the permit requirement if it could establish a vested
right to the current use of the property. In pleading its vested rights
claim, Halaco contended that improvements on the parcel were con-
structed pursuant to properly issued permits by the city. Halaco also
argued that the city knew of the proposed uses of the land, but ad-
vised Halaco that the construction of the contested improvements re-
quired no further permits.' 05
97. Avco Community Dev., 17 Cal. 3d at 793-94, 553 P.2d at 551, 132 Cal. Rptr. at
391.
98. 42 Cal. 3d 52, 720 P.2d 15, 227 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1986).
99. Id. at 59, 720 P.2d at 18, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 670. Halaco Engineering Company
asserted a vested right to continue using a settling pond, water disposal site and a propane
tank. The intensity and the extent of use of the settling pond and the water disposal site were
protected by the court even though the boundaries of these two uses were expanded beyond the
boundaries originally approved by the municipality. However, the court found no vested right
to use the propane tank, and required Halaco to apply for the proper permits. Id. at 75-78,
720 P.2d at 30-32, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 682-84.
100. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
102. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 27404 (West 1976), repealed by CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §
30608 (West 1986); Halaco, 42 Cal. 3d at 59, 720 P.2d at 18-19, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
103. Halaco, 42 Cal. 3d at 59, 720 P.2d at 19, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
104. CAL. PUB. RFS. CODE § 27404 (West 1976), repealed by CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §
30608 (West 1986).
105. Halaco, 42 Cal. 3d at 59, 720 P.2d at 19, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
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The regional coastal commission denied Halaco's claimed vested
right to operate or expand beyond the dimensions of the plant as
described in a 1969 blueprint. The commission reasoned that there
could be no vested right in expansions beyond the blueprints submit-
ted to the city describing the boundaries of the plant's operation.'"
After application of an independent judgment standard of review'0
the trial court ruled in favor of Halaco despite the fact that the per-
mits at issue did not specifically describe operations protected from
further governmental regulation by the court."' The California Su-
preme Court affirmed the trial court's determination as being sup-
ported by substantial evidence.' 09
This decision is important because it is contrary to the Califor-
nia rule that tangible governmental approvals must be issued before
a vested rights claim may be argued," 0 and that a vested right can
be found only in those uses or improvements authorized by govern-
mental agencies."' However, because the opinion focused on the ap-
plicable standard of judicial review, the question of when courts will
recognize a vested right if required approvals have not been secured
by .a plaintiff was left unanswered. 12
III. ANALYSIS
A. Inadequate Definition of the Governmental Act Requirement
A clear majority of jurisdictions require a building permit as the
governmental action on which a vested rights claim may be based."'
While some decisions recognize other preliminary approvals as gov-
ernmental actions," ' California currently recognizes vested rights
only in the stage of work completed pursuant to preliminary per-
106. Id.
107. Id. at 674-82, 720 P.2d at 22-30, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 673-82. For a discussion of this
standard of review and its application see Strumsky v. San Diego County Employee's Retire-
ment Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 520 P.2d 29, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1974).
108. The trial court protected Halaco Engineering Company's right to continue using a
settling pond and a waste disposal site in part because the city knew the full extent of the use
of the improvements in determining that no permits were required for these uses. Halaco, 42
Cal. 3d at 60-61, 720 P.2d at 20, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
109. Id. at 60-61, 720 P.2d at 20, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
110. See supra notes 7, 65, 67, 97 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
112. Halaco, 42 Cal. 3d at 674-82, 720 P.2d at 220-33, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 673-82.
113. See supra notes 7, 65 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 81, 86, 93, 99 and accompanying text.
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mits." 5  However, this strict rule is inequitable in many
circumstances.
For example, assume a hypothetical plaintiff is constructing an
apartment complex. After receiving preliminary approvals, and ap-
plying for a final grading permit from the proper municipal authori-
ties, the plaintiff grades the property and installs other improve-
ments in accordance with the final grading permit. The plaintiff
then proceeds to construct the foundation for the project after apply-
ing for and receiving a foundation permit from the planning depart-
ment. In the midst of construction of the foundation, an application
for a building permit is submitted. The plaintiff then finds that the
property on which the project is constructed is being rezoned to a
lower density as part of a change in the city's comprehensive zoning
plan. Under California's current laws, this plaintiff has a vested
right to complete only the foundation of the project."' There is no
right to complete the entire apartment complex as originally
planned. In fact, substantial work must be completed and substantial
expenditures must be incurred in constructing the foundation before
the plaintiff may claim the right to complete even that stage'of the
work." 7 This strict rule leaves the plaintiff with a burdensome, in-
complete project which must be razed if the plaintiff later decides to
construct improvements according to new zoning regulations..
The above example epitomizes the general rule that a yalid
building permit must issue before a right to complete construction of
a project vests.1" 8 Avco" 0 exemplifies this rule in terms of California
law. As in the above example, the California Supreme Court fol-
lowed the general rule in denying Avco Community Developers a
vested right to construct improvements because no building permits
were issued for construction of specific buildings. 2
However, the Avco decision also presents the possibility that
governmental approvals which provide essentially the same specific-
ity and definition to a project as a building permit may be sufficient
to vest rights. 21 The California Supreme Court's recent decision in
Halaco122 implicitly extended the principles applied in Avco by find-
115. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 7, 65 and accompanying text.
119. 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976).
120. Id. at 793-800, 553 P.2d at 551-56, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 391-96.
121. Id. at 793-94, 553 P.2d at 551, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
122. 42 Cal. 3d 52, 720 P.2d 15, 227 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1986).
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ing a vested right in nonconforming uses of improvements already
constructed."' This holding is significant because a vested right to
use existing improvements was established despite the fact that the
permits received by the plaintiff did not specifically define the uses
and improvements protected from further governmental regula-
tion. 24 However, the California Supreme Court failed to articulate
any rules governing when a vested right to construct or use existing
improvements may be found if required permits have not been re-
ceived, or if the permits received by a plaintiff inadequately define
uses or improvements asserted to be protected from further govern-
mental regulation. This unresolved issue is significant because recog-
nition of a vested right, even though required permits are absent, is
an exception to the general rule that a vested right must be based on
tangible governmental approvals.1"5 Further definition of this appar-
ent exception should be articulated by the courts. Halaco not only
fails to set forth an exception to the rule that governmental permits
authorizing a particular use or course of development must issue
before a vested rights claim is tenable, but the decision further clouds
the issue of what governmental actions, short of a building permit,
can form the basis of a vested rights claim to construct
improvements.
B. Inconsistent Case Law
Avco and Halaco also fail to address the issue of when a vested
right might be recognized if requisite permits have not issued. Addi-
tionally, these opinions illustrate the inconsistent decisions which
may result if required governmental permits have not been secured
by a plaintiff. The cases also demonstrate a broader problem: the
failure of California's legal system to articulate more definitive rules
explaining the governmental action requirement. While there are de-
cisions which provode guidance, " existing laws require subjective
judgments to determine whether the government acted in a manner
sufficient for a plaintiff to successfully argue that he or she detrimen-
tally relied on these actions.
Because of uncertainty in this area of law, rights deserving pro-
tection are being abridged. Furthermore, inconsistent applications of
the law have broader social implications beyond abrogation of the
123. Id.
124. Id. at 75-76, 720 P.2d at 30-31, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
125. See supra notes 7, 67, 96 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 76-96 and accompanying text.
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rights of individuals involved in vested rights litigation. Because of
uncertainty in the development process, developers are often unwill-
ing to make substantial investments without a larger rate of return to
offset the greater risks involved. Consumers eventually absorb these
hidden costs in the form of higher housing prices."' Additionally,
municipal agencies suffer more legal challenges concerning vested
rights because of the lack of judicial specificity in this area. The re-
sulting time and effort used in costly litigation absorbs more munici-
pal resources than would be necessary if clearer rules existed.'
Also, a more specific body of law would hopefully result in munaici-
palities acting more responsibly in denying or approving develop-
ment projects or variance permits. Responsibility in approving build-
ing permits and enforcing zoning ordinances would be encouraged
since municipalities could be held accountable for their actions by a
landowner demanding just compensation for a taking of property.
California cases not only fail to establish what permits define a
governmental action, they also illustrate the failure of California's
courts to establish a more practical and equitable body of law gov-
erning vested rights. One of the easiest and most logical methods to
establish a more cohesive body of law is to modify the governmental
act element. What is needed is an equitable rule of law to adequately
protect an individual's property rights, while preserving governmen-
tal control of land use through zoning to protect the population and
the environment.
IV. PROPOSAL
A. Objectively Reasonable Good-Faith Belief by the Plaintiff
Rather than examining the extent of the government's actions,
equity would be served by requiring a plaintiff to entertain an objec-
tively reasonable, good faith belief" 9 that he or she could develop or
use property in a certain manner. Several factors could be investi-
gated to determine whether a plaintiff exhibited an objectively rea-
sonable, good-faith belief to develop or use property as specified by
127. SIEMON, LARSON & PORTER, supra note 43, at 3.
128. SIEMON, LARSON & PORTER, supra note 43, at 3.
129. A good faith belief should be distinguished from a good faith expectancy. A belief
is defined as a "[clonviction of the mind, arising not from actual perception or knowledge, but
by way of inference, or from evidence received or information derived from others." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 141 (5th ed. 1979). In contrast, an expectancy refers to a condition of being
deferred to a future time or of dependance upon an expected event. Id. at 517. Thus, for a
reasonable good-faith belief to exist, the landowner must base his or her belief on tangible
evidence and information derived from government officials or other governmental actions.
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the government. One of the most important factors to scrutinize
under this approach is which governmental permits or approvals
have been secured by a plaintiff. This factor would not be dispositive
of whether a reasonable good-faith belief existed, but would be only
one of several elements considered in making this decision. As an
example, if a preliminary grading permit has issued, the reasonable-
ness of a belief to build or grade the property is questionable since
final approval to grade was not granted. Likewise, a belief that de-
velopment or a significant change in a property's use could be ac-
complished without any governmental approvals could not be consid-
ered reasonable since the government has a clear interest in
regulating land development and land use.
The sophistication of the plaintiff involved in vested rights liti-
gation should also be considered. An experienced developer with an
excellent understanding of development procedures could be held to
a higher standard than an individual constructing a small project or
a small businessman seeking approval of a nonconforming use.
Courts should require strict compliance with all regulations if a so-
phisticated plaintiff is adjudicating a vested rights claim. In contrast,
substantial compliance should suffice if the plaintiff is relatively un-
sophisticated. Analysis of this factor would ensure a more equitable
approach in adjudicating vested rights cases since an individual's ob-jective beliefs would be directly relevant in determining the appro-
priate level of compliance.
B. Application of the New Standard
Existing vested rights laws do not adequately protect plaintiffs
from governmentally imposed changes in land uses even though such
plaintiffs may have a good faith belief that development or existing
uses of real property could continue. As an example, the hypothetical
plaintiff discussed above could have formed an objectively reasonable
good faith belief that construction of the proposed apartment com-
plex would be allowed. Under the proposed change, the plaintiff
would prevail; the law would ensure protection of the plaintiff's rea-
sonable beliefs. Existing law, however, would vest in the plaintiff
only the right to construct the foundation in accordance with the
foundation permit. 8 ' This alternative proposal would help protect
plaintiffs during the period prior to issuance of a building permit but
after preliminary permits such as a final grading permit or founda-
130. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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tion permit have issued. This alternative proposal would lend equity
to current laws which are unduly strict.
Such a system should also adequately protect the government's
power to control land use and development since the alternative ap-
proach still requires that the plaintiff complete substantial work and
incur substantial liabilities before a vested right accrues. Addition-
ally, the government could convey its intention to allow only a spe-
cific stage of development by expressly informing the property owner
that completion of a project requires further governmental approvals,
and that there is no assurance that a permit for completion of the
entire building or structure will be granted.' In such a case, the
plaintiff could not proceed with the planned development in good
faith, and would thus be precluded from asserting a vested rights
claim.
This alternative proposal is also easily applied to vested rights
issues in the context of a nonconforming use of property. Under the
facts of Halaco,"'8 the reasonableness of Halaco's management in
proceeding with operations without a permit would be examined to
determine whether a vested right exists. Taking into consideration
the fact that valid approvals were received from the proper munici-
pal agencies, and that these agencies knew the full extent of Halaco's
proposed operations, it is arguable that Halaco entertained a reason-
able, good-faith belief to use improvements in a non-conforming
manner. If this were determined, then the substantial expenditures
and substantial work completed by Halaco in expanding existing
uses would indicate that a vested right should be recognized.
V. CONCLUSION
The issue of when rights in real property vest results from the
conflict between individual rights and the government's need to regu-
late uses of real property through application of the police power.
This conflict has manifested itself in laws mandating estoppel of fur-
ther governmental regulation of real property if a vested right can be
established.
As a general rule, a vested right is recognized if a plaintiff per-
forms substantial work and incurs substantial liabilities in good faith
reliance on governmental actions. Normally, governmental action is
defined by issuance of a valid permit authorizing a specific use of
property or course of development. The California Supreme Court's
131. McCarthy, 129 Cal. App. 3d at 233, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
132. See supra notes 97-111 and accompanying text.
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recent decision in Halaco realized a vested right to use existing im-
provements not specifically defined in permits received by the com-
pany. This decision is significant because it is contrary to the general
rule that a vested right can be found only in uses of property specifi-
cally allowed by governmental authorizations. This decision also
complicates the issue of when courts may be willing to recognize
vested rights in real property if requisite permits have not been
issued.
This comment examines the historical evolution of vested rights
laws, and analyzes several factors which serve as a guideline to de-,
termine when a vested right might be found if required approvals
have not been secured by a plaintiff. This comment proposes a new
method to adjudicate vested rights cases. This new method examines
whether a plaintiff entertained an objectively reasonable good faith
belief that the government would allow construction or use of im-
provements, rather than examining only the extent of the govern-
ment's actions.
The proposed approach compares favorably to current laws
which fail to protect plaintiffs from zoning or other regulatory
changes arising after the issuance of preliminary approvals. This
proposal may be applied to the adjudication of vested rights suits
regarding development or nonconforming uses, resulting in a more
equitable outcome for plaintiffs involved in such litigation. Further-
more, this proposal adequately protects the government's interest in
regulating land uses by preserving the government's police powers.
Steven L. McNeal
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